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How much must I reduce my greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions if I want to do my fair share to
contribute towards the global effort to keep global warming below a 2 1C rise in average temperature
over preindustrial times? This paper suggests an answer for nations and corporations that want to
move ahead of legislation on a voluntary basis.
If all nations reduce their ‘‘GHG emissions per unit of GDP’’ by 5% per year, global GHG emissions
will be 50% lower in 2050 than in 2010 as long as the global economy continues to grow at its historical
rate of 3.5% per year. The suggested 5% per year decline can be translated into a corporate resolution to
reduce corporate ‘‘GHG emissions per unit of value added’’ (GEVA) by 5% per year.
If all corporations cut their GEVA by 5% per year, the same global result will be achieved.
The suggested 5% per year decline can be used as a guideline for responsible action on a voluntary
basis. The guideline is unlikely to be made mandatory soon, but compulsory publication of the
necessary emissions and productivity data by nations and corporations could help civil society
highlight top performers.
& 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. The research question
1.1. Fair share in voluntary climate action
This paper suggests an answer to the question: how much
must I reduce my greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions if I am to do
my fair share to contribute towards the global effort to keep
global warming below a 2 1C rise in average temperature over
preindustrial times. The answer is provided both for nations and
for corporations that want to move ahead of international agree-
ments and national legislation on a voluntary basis.
The ﬁrst part of the paper presents the logic behind the
suggested answer, which is to cut ‘‘GHG emissions per unit of
GDP’’ at the national level and ‘‘GHG emissions per unit of value
added’’ at the corporate level, both by 5% per year. The second
part of the paper discusses the concepts involved and provides
some illustrative data for national and corporate performance.
The third and ﬁnal part of the paper discusses issues related to
practical use of the two indicators.1.2. Global goals for climate stabilisation and poverty alleviation
The world has been debating the challenge of sustainable
development since the term was coined by the Brundtlandll rights reserved.Commission in 1987. The exact content of the challenge has
remained unclear, but there is emerging international consen-
sus that the global endeavour for a more sustainable world
includes two main ambitions: the desire to alleviate world
poverty; and the desire to avoid dangerous climate change.
The world increasingly agrees on its main tool in the endeavour to
ﬁght poverty— namely continued economic growth. Similarly, the
chosen tool in the effort to avoid dangerous climate change is
general reduction in global emissions of GHG.
The world has furthermore agreed on quantitative goals for
this dual effort. These goals are summarised in the United Nations
(UN) Millennium Development Goals, which seeks poverty alle-
viation (UN, 2012a), and the UN Framework Convention for
Climate Change, which seeks to keep man-made global warming
below a danger threshold. Fig. 1 presents the dual challenge in a
40-year historical perspective.
The UN Millennium goals cover a spectrum of global ambitions
related to development: ranging from higher income, via better
health, nourishment, living conditions, and education to
improved physical safety and human rights. The tool intended
to deliver these goals is economic growth, particularly in the
developing and emerging world. The implicit quantitative goal
is to continue to expand world GDP at the historical rate of 3.5%
per year in real terms.
On the climate side, the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 represented
the ﬁrst step on the way toward reduced GHG emissions. The
Kyoto Protocol outlined common, yet differentiated responsibil-
ities for the world’s nations to cut GHG emissions by 5% from
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Fig. 1. Gross domestic product (GDP), emissions of CO2, and the ratio CO2
emissions per unit GDP (Index values, 1970¼1), World 1970–2010 (Based on
data from Penn World Tables and BP Statistical Review of World Energy).
1 The UK Climate Change Act 2008 is available at /http://www.legislation.
gov.uk/ukpga/2008/27/contentsS.
J. Randers / Energy Policy 48 (2012) 46–55 471990 to 2008–2012. Later, in 2009, the danger threshold was
agreed to be 2 1C above average global temperatures in preindus-
trial times. The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
has also concluded that keeping below plus 2 1C will require a
reduction in global GHG emissions of 50–80% by 2050. I choose
the lower number in this range, accepting that this increases
the risk of not staying below plus 2 1C. As a rough summary, the
world ambition is to cut GHG emissions by 50% by 2050, while
maintaining economic growth at historical rates of 3.5% per year.
1.3. Global tools for climate stabilisation and poverty alleviation
Economic growth is pursued in various ways, based on
theoretical considerations and experience from the last century
of active effort to increase global growth rates. The establishment
of a stable institutional framework has played an important role,
as has liberalisation and trade. One major recent success is the
economic expansion of China, and there are signs of acceleration
in a number of emerging economies. Long-term growth rates in
the rich industrialised countries have been below the world
average, around 2.5% per year since 1970. Corporations – private
or public – play an important role as the central vehicle of growth
in all economies.
Reduction of GHG emissions are achieved in various ways.
Some cuts have occurred simply because they were proﬁtable at
current prices. After the year 2000, more reductions have become
proﬁtable as a result of higher prices for fossil energy (coal, oil
and gas— the main sources of man-made CO2 emissions). Higher
prices have made it commercially attractive to cut the use of fossil
energy, and thereby GHG emissions, throughout the economy.
Additional efforts have been made to accelerate the reduction
of GHG emissions. Three important tools are (a) pricing of
GHG emissions; (b) new legislation to reduce emissions: and
(c) voluntary activities to limit emissions from corporations,
organisations, or local communities.
Pricing has attracted the most interest. After an initial focus on
carbon taxes on coal, oil and gas – levied at the mine face or at
different places in the economy – recent efforts have sought to
establish effective cap and trade systems for corporate emission
rights. The European Union’s Emission Trading System (ETS) is the
most advanced system, but even this ETS has not been able to
establish a stable, high and motivating quota price. Concerning
legislation, examples include emission standards, mandatory
requirements for the use of renewable electricity and heat, andreduced deforestation. An uncommon example of broader legisla-
tion is the United Kingdom Climate Act1 which commits the
country to reducing its national emissions at a predetermined
rate up to a total cut of 80% by 2050. In addition to pricing and
legislation, there are, of course, voluntary cuts beyond what is
proﬁtable and compulsory. These can be substantial and often
constitute an element in corporate social responsibility (CSR)
strategies or in citizen’s initiatives at the city, local or even
household level.
This far, neither pricing, nor legislation, nor voluntary action
has been put in place at a rate which is sufﬁcient to mitigate the
impacts of climate change. Calculations show that the sum of
national commitments as of 2011 will lead to a temperature
increase of plus 2.5 1C by 2050, and much higher in the second
part of the century (Climate Interactive, 2011). Much deeper cuts
need to be agreed to, and this is the ambition of the ongoing
climate negotiations.
Thus the question remains how the world could cut GHG
emissions by 50% by 2050, while maintaining economic growth at
historical rates of 3.5% per year.
1.4. Three strategies for cutting GHG emissions
There are three ways of splitting the task of cutting GHG
emissions among the world’s emitters.
1.4.1. Proportional cuts through legislation
The simplest way to cut emissions is to ask ‘‘everyone’’ to cut
50% by 2050, which amounts to a reduction of 1.7% per year. If all
nations, cities, corporations, and households cut at this rate,
global warming would be kept below 2 1C. Each emitter could
use their current emissions as the basis for calculating their
proportional part of the total effort. If everyone cut their emis-
sions by 1.7% per year, irrespective of how fast they grew
economically, this reduction would solve the global problem..
This strategy could be translated into milestones on a suitable
time horizon, like ‘‘minus 20% by 2020.’’ I call this strategy
‘‘proportional cuts.’’
The main argument against proportional cuts is that it is
neither cost efﬁcient nor fair. It is much simpler and cheaper to
cut GHG emissions in some places than others. For example it is
much cheaper (in euros per ton of CO2 avoided) to reduce
emissions by stopping the harvest of northern forests than by
introducing electric cars. But, the simple proportional cut strategy
is also seen as blatantly unfair by the less industrialised countries.
Most of the current man-made CO2 in the atmosphere has been
emitted by the rich industrialised countries since preindustrial
times. It is therefore argued that the poorer nations should be
allowed to emit more GHG during their endeavour to overcome
poverty.
1.4.2. Pricing of emissions through quota trading
In order to make the cut strategy more cost effective it is
commonly proposed to base the cuts on a system of ‘‘quota
trading.’’ This strategy involves establishing a cap and trade
system, which automatically picks the cheapest reduction pro-
jects and ensures that capital ﬂows to these projects from the
participants in the system. The cap equals the total number of
emission rights allowed by the system at the beginning of each
year. Trade occurs when each participant in the system is obliged
to hand in enough emission rights every year to cover their
emissions.
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solved by allowing some nations to operate outside the trading
system (i.e., without the obligation to buy emission rights to
cover their emissions). For example, one could agree that devel-
oping countries should not be required to participate before their
per capita emissions have reached the same level as per capita
emissions in the rich world.
But it has proved difﬁcult to establish effective quota trading.
The main problem has been political opposition – both from
industry and labour – against making the cap sufﬁciently tight, for
fear that this would threaten economic growth, employment, and
poverty alleviation. The result has been so generous caps (i.e., so
high ceilings) that the price of an emission right (i.e., the quota
price) has remained too low to make important climate projects
proﬁtable. As an example, the quota price in the EU Emissions
Trading System is expected to deliver a quota price around
20h/tCO2e in 2020 (KLIF, 2010). This amount is below what is
necessary to make wind power, electric cars, and carbon capture
and storage economically competitive.1.4.3. Voluntary reductions
The third possible strategy to cut GHG emissions is through
voluntary action. This is what responsible and conscientious
global players (nations, cities, corporations, and households)
might choose to do even though it is neither proﬁtable nor
mandatory.
There are many reasons why emitters would take on such
commitments despite the cost and the hassle. First, they may
believe that proactive reductions will improve their position in
the long run. Corporations may draw competitive advantage from
practical experience with new technologies, and nations may
reduce future costs by subsidising early shifts to green technol-
ogies. Second, emitters may think that voluntary action will
improve their general reputation, and speciﬁcally help them
retain attractive staff or citizens. Third emitters may cut simply
because they believe this is the right thing to do.
But how far should they go? How much should they cut? This
is a relevant question if the emitter is willing to move ahead of
established policy. It is also the central question asked in this
paper. How much must a corporation cut if it voluntarily wants to
do its fair share of the global effort to keep global warming below
2 1C? Similarly, at the national level: How much must a nation cut
if the nation wants to do its fair share of the global effort — even
if there is no international agreement that divides the task among
the nations?
1.5. How much is enough at the national level?
As mentioned above, the dual global ambition is to halve
global GHG emissions over the next forty years, while maintain-
ing the same growth rate in world GDP as during the last
forty years.
In quantitative terms this means reducing GHG emissions by
50% from 2010 to 2050 (which is equivalent to a decline of 1.7%
per year), while keeping the world economy growing at 3.5% per
year in real terms. In sum, this implies a reduction of ‘‘GHG
emissions per unit of GDP’’ by 5% per year.
This quantitative result is obtained as follows: If global GHG
emissions in 2010 is deﬁned as 1, and global GDP in 2010 is also
deﬁned as 1, the dual ambition is that GHG emissions in 2050
shall be 0.5 and that GDP in 2050 shall be 4.0 (the result
of growing at the historical rate of 3.5% per year for forty years).
The ratio ‘‘GHG per unit of GDP’’ must thereby decline from 1/
1¼1 in 2010 to 0.5/4¼0.125 in 2050. The latter is equivalent to
an annual decline of 5% per year for forty years.Thus, it is simple to tell what is ‘‘enough’’ at the national level.
If all nations pursue economic growth as they have done histori-
cally, with the same success rate, and at the same time reduce
their GHG emissions per unit of GDP by 5% per year, then GHG
emissions in 2050 will be 50% below current levels and the world
economy 400% of current levels (four times as big as today). This
could be enough to eliminate poverty and avoid dangerous global
warming.
In summary, the world would make a major step towards
climate stabilisation and poverty alleviation if all nations volun-
tarily committed to reducing their GHG emissions per unit of GDP
by 5% per year, while keeping economic growth at traditional
rates. Therefore cutting by 5% per year would constitute a
reasonable ambition if the nation’s goal was to do its fair share
of the global effort.
But, although the suggested decline rate of 5% per year would
sufﬁce, there are many reasons why nations would insist on
differentiated responsibilities, as I will discuss in a later section.1.6. How much Is enough at the corporate level?
The national ambition to cut 5% per year can be translated into
a resolution at the corporate level, since the nation’s GDP is the
sum of the value added of all of its corporations.
The corporate contribution to GDP is technically named the
corporate ‘‘value added,’’ and is deﬁned as ‘‘total revenues less all
purchases of goods and services from external suppliers.’’ Thus
the nation’s GDP will grow by 3.5% per year if all of its corpora-
tions increase their value added by 3.5% per year. Similarly, a
nation’s GHG emission is the sum of the emissions of all of its
corporations. Thus the nation’s emissions would decline by 1.7%
per year if all its corporations – and all its households – cut their
emissions by 1.7% per year.
Notice that, for the sake of brevity, I use the word ‘‘corpora-
tion’’ to denote any entity (private or public, for proﬁt or not)
involved in economic activity. Thus the word ‘‘corporation’’
includes not only businesses, but also hospitals and universities,
NGOs, and governmental agencies. Notice also that I need to
include explicitly the emissions from ‘‘households’’ (the nation’s
ﬁnal consumers), since they do not add to the GDP or to corporate
value added, according to standard deﬁnitions.
In summary, the nation would succeed in reducing its GHG
emissions per unit of GDP by 5% per year, if all its corporations
reduced their GEVA by 5% per year (and all households reduced
their emissions by 1.7% per year). Therefore cutting GEVA by 5%
per year would constitute a reasonable ambition if the corpora-
tion’s goal is to do its fair share of the global effort.
But although the suggested decline of 5% per year would
sufﬁce, there are many reasons why corporations could argue
for differentiated responsibilities, as I will discuss in a later
section.2. Concepts, measurement and data
2.1. At the national level — the GHG/GDP ratio
The concept of GHG emissions and GDP are well deﬁned and
commonly used at the national level. Most nations provide annual
data on their GDP according to procedures developed since World
War II. Many nations measure the annual GHG emissions from
their territory, using procedures developed and negotiated by the
UNFCCC (UNFCCC, 2012). By dividing the two numbers, one
obtains GHG emissions per unit of GDP. By following the GHG/
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suggested decline rate of 5% per year.
2.1.1. Longitudinal data
Fig. 2 shows how the ratio has developed over the last forty
years for ﬁve regions of the world, plus for the world total. Notice
that the ﬁgure is limited to one greenhouse gas, namely CO2,
because data is lacking on most of the other 5 Kyoto-gases. But
CO2 is a reasonably good measure, since it represents some 80% of
total man-made GHG emissions.
The numbers underlying Fig. 2 are highlighted in the table
below, which shows that the GHG emissions per unit of GDP for
the world as a total declined at 1.7% per year. Table 1
The regions varied in their performance. The industrial world
reduced its GHG/GDP ratio by some 2% per year. China and BRISE
(Brazil, Russia, India, South Africa and the ten biggest Emerging
economies) made the fastest cuts, at around 2.8% per year. But all
were far below the suggested decline rate of 5% per year.
2.1.2. A real challenge
Although it is simple to calculate the path of the GHG/GDP
ratio at the national level, no region has been able to make it
decline by 5% per year over the last forty years. But the goal may
still be attainable. For example, the EU has committed to cut its
GHG emissions by 20% from 2010 to 2020. During these ten years
the EU economy would grow by 25% if past growth rates were
continued. Thus, if the EU reached both goals, its GHG/GDP
ratio would fall from 1/1¼1 in 2010 to 0.8/1.25¼0.62 in 2020.
This amounts to an annual decline of 4.4% per year, and is not far
from what would be the EU’s ‘‘fair share’’ of a global effort.0.000
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Fig. 2. GHG emissions per unit of GDP (in kgCO2 per 2010-USD), ﬁve regions and
the world total, 1970–2010 (Based on data from Penn World Tables and BP
Statistical Review of World Energy).
Table 1
GHG per GDP in 2010, and rate of decline in GHG per GDP from 1970–2010.
Region GHG per GDP in 2010
in kgCO2 per 2010-USD
Rate of decline in GHG per
GDP from 1970 to 2010 in
% per year
U.S. 0.45 2.1
OECD (less U.S.) 0.31 1.8
China 0.74 2.7
Brise 0.49 2.8
Rest of world 0.36 0.8
Sum world 0.44 1.72.1.3. Common boundaries
It is important to use the same boundary for the calculation of
GHG emissions and GDP. The emissions data should cover the
emissions from all production involved in the gross domestic
product. Emissions from tourism abroad should not be included,
while emissions from visiting tourists should be. Emissions from
the production of an imported car should not be included, but
emissions from domestic car productions should, even if the car is
exported. Absorption through photosynthesis in domestic forests
should be credited to the nation. The emissions from use of the
wood is (slightly illogical, but by convention) debited to the
country that cut the tree.2.1.4. Stable growth rate at global level
The global ambition of a 50% cut in GHG emissions will be
achieved if all nations cut their GHG/GDP ratio by 5% per year, as
long as the world economy grows at 3.5% per year. Notice the
presumption that the growth rates of the individual nations will
add up to a stable long-term growth rate of the world economy of
3.5% per year — in the future as in the past. Some nations will
indeed grow faster, but others will grow slower than desired and
planned. In the past this mixture of success led to an expansion of
the world economy at 3.5% per year. If we assume the same
degree of average success during the next forty years, the world
economy will continue to expand at 3.5% per year. In that case, if
all nations reduce their GHG/GDP ratio by 5% per year over these
forty years, total GHG emissions will be 50% lower in 2050.2.1.5. Robust decline rate
The number 5% per year is relatively robust against variations
in the assumptions made. If the GDP growth rate is varied within
the range from 2.5 to 4.5% per year, and the GHG reduction varied
within the range from 0.2 to 0.8, the suggested decline rate in the
GHG/GDP ratio varies within the range from 3.0 to 8.5% per year.
Thus 5% might serve as a reasonable average guideline for
voluntary action.2.1.6. The distributional issue
Finally, there is the question of whether it makes sense to ask
all nations to cut their GHG/GDP ratio at the same rate. The
answer is obviously no. Most of the GHG in the current atmo-
sphere was put there by the current rich industrialised countries,
and many argue that these countries should take the lead in the
effort to reduce man-made GHG emissions. The industrialised
countries could do so by requiring their GHG/GDP ratio to drop
faster than 5% per year. They could achieve this goal either by
deeper cuts in domestic emissions or by paying for cuts abroad
and including these reductions in the numerator of the GHG/
GDP ratio.
There are many ways to differentiate the responsibilities
among nations. For example, it has been suggested that the
industrialised countries should cut their emissions by 80% by
2050, not by the 50% which I have assumed this far. In the 80%
scenario, the industrialised countries would have to reduce their
GHG/GDP ratio to (1–0.8)/4¼0.05 by 2050, if we continue to
assume an economic growth rate of 3.5% per year. This would
require a decline rate of 7% per year. Thus, one solution to the
distributional issue would be for the industrialised countries to
cut by 7% per year and the other nations by 3% per year so that the
average remains at the suggested decline rate of 5% per year. In
order to manage long-term changes in wealth, one could agree to
shift countries from the poor to the rich category when their GDP
per person exceeds a certain threshold (for example the expected
GDP per person in China in 2020).
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tion of equity, it is important to be aware of the distributional
effect of using the 5% per year decline rate for all countries. This
effect is easily seen if starting from the observation that emerging
economies tend to grow faster than the industrialised countries.
The difference is signiﬁcant. In the long run the GDP expands by
around 7% per year in emerging economies and around 2% per
year in the industrialised world. If both regions reduce their GHG/
GDP ratio by the same 5% per year, the result is a decline in
absolute emissions by 3% per year in the industrial world versus
an increase in emissions by 2% per year in the emerging world.
One could argue that this automatic shift in the global distribu-
tion of the emission of GHG is sufﬁcient to counter the historical
inequity.
Obviously, the discussion about how much the rich should cut
is a controversial question. But there is useful guidance in the fact
that if all nations cut their GHG/GDP ratio by 5% per year, global
CO2 emissions in 2050 would be 50% lower, assuming continua-
tion of the historical GDP growth.
A totally different approach to differentiated responsibilities is
based on GHG emissions per person, rather than per unit of GDP.
This line of thought starts from the presumption that each person
has the same right to emit greenhouse gases. Thus the long-term
target should be equal per capita emissions in all nations. To get
there, the ‘‘leading’’ nations with the highest per capita emissions
would start the effort by cutting their emissions. Over the years
they would gradually lower their per capita emissions, towards
the level of the (still rising) per capita emissions in the rest of the
world. The only obligation of those other countries would be to
start cutting once their per capita emissions starts to exceed the
(now falling) per capita emissions in the leading nations
(Holtsmark and Randers, 2008).
2.2. At the corporate level — GEVA
It is harder to ﬁnd data for GHG emissions per unit of value
added at the corporate level.
2.2.1. Corporate greenhouse gas emissions
GHG emissions (in tons of CO2 equivalents per year) are
published by the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) for a large
number of corporations (CDP, 2010). But CDP only provides data
for a few recent years, so it is near impossible to ﬁnd the long
time series illustrated in Figs. 1 and 2 at the national level. CDP
provides emissions from within three sets of corporate bound-
aries. ‘‘Scope 1’’ emissions are direct emissions from operations
controlled by the corporation. ‘‘Scope 2’’ emissions are mainly the
emissions from the electricity purchased by the corporation from
external suppliers. Finally, ‘‘Scope 3’’ emissions are all upstream
and downstream emissions not included in Scopes 1 and 2.2
Ideally the data should cover all 6 Kyoto-gases, but are often
limited to CO2.
So, when calculating the GEVA for a corporation, one should
only include its Scope 1 emissions, since these are the emissions
that emanate from the creation of value in the corporation.
2.2.2. Corporate value added
The corporate contribution to the nation’s GDP is not com-
monly calculated or made available, although it can be derived
from the annual ﬁnancial statements. The challenge is that the
corporate accounts do not traditionally focus on value added, but
on other measures of proﬁtability. Economic value added is2 These concepts are deﬁned in the Greenhouse Gas Protocol available at
www.ghgprotocol.org/ﬁles/ghg-protocol-revised.pdfdeﬁned as the difference in economic value between the outputs
and the inputs of the corporation. In accounting terms ‘‘value
added’’ equals ‘‘sales revenue less the cost of goods and services
purchased from external suppliers.’’ This concept is approximated
by the term ‘‘Gross Proﬁt’’ in US accounting, which is often
directly available in the annual ﬁnancial statement. In European
accounting, value added can be calculated from basic data in the
ﬁnancial statements. Economic value added is approximately
equal to ‘‘operating proﬁt, i.e., earnings before interest and
depreciation (EBITDA)’’ plus all ‘‘personnel costs.’’ Personnel costs
should include payment to management and board members. The
approximation is good as long as there are no payments to
external suppliers included in the ﬁnal estimate of value added.
The value added of corporations that do not sell their output
(for example public hospitals or NGOs) is normally measured as
the sum of all costs, less payments to external suppliers. As an
example, the value added in an elderly persons’ nursing home is
dominated by labour and lodging costs, and typically shows little
change from year to year beyond the real rise in wage costs. The
direct GHG emissions are dominated by heating, cooling and
transport emissions.
Long time series for the economic value added in corporations
are also uncommon, but can be obtained from historical accounts,
although there are problems arising from changes in the reporting
boundary, which should be the same for measurement of both
GHG emissions and value added.
Using value added as the denominator in GEVA (rather than
for example sales) allocates responsibility for climate cuts in an
unambiguous manner among corporations and organisations and
avoids the problem of double counting.2.2.3. GEVA
In those cases where data for GHG emissions (in tons of CO2e
per year) and for value added (in USD million per year) are
available, it is possible to calculate GEVA — the GHG emissions
per unit of value added (in kg of CO2e per USD).
Fig. 3 shows GEVA for a number of US corporations in 2008,
but once more limited to CO2 emissions. The numbers vary
greatly between industries, as would be expected, and within
industries. The utilities sector produce little economic value per
ton of CO2, and have high GEVAs. The reason is that the large
emissions from the production of electricity from coal and gas are
counted, correctly, as Scope 1 emissions from this sector. At the
other end of the spectrum, telecommunications, ﬁnancial institu-
tions, and IT have low emissions, arising largely from ofﬁce
operations and travel in company cars (and jets). They create
much economic value per ton of Scope 1 GHG emissions. They are
more carbon efﬁcient — with smaller GEVAs.
It is very difﬁcult to ﬁnd longitudinal data on GEVA for time
periods that are long enough to establish a trend. I have only
succeeded in obtaining indicative data from a random sample of
progressive ﬁrms. Fig. 4 shows the GEVA of BT – the British
telecommunications giant – from 1997 to 2008. BT is widely seen
as a leader in the sustainability ﬁeld and did reduce its GEVA by
28% over these 11 years. This is equivalent to a decline of 2.9% per
year, which is short of BT’s ‘‘fair share’’ and which would have
required a decline of 5% per year.
Fig. 5 shows the GEVA for SABMiller – the multinational
brewery – from 2005–201010. SABMiller appears to have done
its ‘‘fair share,’’ albeit over a shorter time period, and perhaps
from a advantageous starting point.
When calculating the trend in GEVA, it is important to use
numbers corrected for inﬂation.
Otherwise, corporate performance will look better than reality
because the growth in value added is higher when measured in
Fig. 3. Greenhouse gas emissions per unit of value added (in kg CO2 per USD), US Corporations 2008 (Thanks to Rich Baltimore of ClearCarbon Consulting Inc for having
provided this data).
J. Randers / Energy Policy 48 (2012) 46–55 51nominal money. The spurious improvement can be signiﬁcant
relative to the target of minus 5% per year.
A third estimate of past corporate GEVA performance is more
indirect. The Carbon Disclosure Project has done various surveys
of corporate climate policy. In one survey they investigated the
use of intensity indicators among the world’s 100 largestcompanies (CDP, 2009). CDP found that one third of the compa-
nies in the survey had established GHG emissions targets on an
intensity basis - typically per unit of revenue, per ton of produc-
tion, or per employee — instead of in absolute terms. These
companies were expecting to reduce their GHG emissions per unit
of sales by 3.3% per year on average — impressive, but still short
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Fig. 4. Greenhouse gas emissions per unit of value added (in kgCO2e per 2010-£),
British Telecom, Scope 1, 1997–2008 (Thanks to Chris Tuppen of Advancing
Sustainability LLP who undertook the big effort of collecting the data in Figs. 4,
6 and 7 in 2008 while Chief Sustainability Ofﬁcer of BT).
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Fig. 5. CO2 emissions per unit of value added (in kgCO2 per 2010-USD), SABMiller,
Scope 1, 2005–2010 (Thanks to Peter Koegler of SABMiller for obtaining the data
in Fig. 5).
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Fig. 6. Greenhouse gas emissions per unit of value added (in kg CO2e per 2010-£),
British Telecom, Scope 1þ2, 1997–2008.
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3.3% per year through future growth rates (in sales) of 2.6% per
year and absolute reductions of 0.7% per year.3. Discussion
GEVA is well deﬁned and can be measured at the corporate
level, but this in not yet commonly done. Below we discuss a
number of issues related to the use of GEVA as a corporate guide
to voluntary climate action.3.1. Scope 1 avoids double counting
The main reason to focus solely on Scope 1 emissions when
calculating GEVA is that Scope 1 emissions of all corporations add
up to national emissions. One avoids double counting — for
example of the double counting of the emissions from the energy
sector if the users of the energy also include their Scope 2 emis-
sions in their report. It is important to notice, again, that one must
include separately the GHG emissions from ﬁnal consumers —
those that do not create value, but still burns fossil fuels or emit
GHG in other ways.If Scope 2 emissions were included in GEVA, the emissions
from the nation’s utilities would be counted twice. This problem
could be avoided by excluding all utilities from the GEVA report-
ing requirement, and ask all other corporations to report on the
sum of Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions. But then it would become
unclear what denominator to use when establishing the national
target for the GHG/GDP ratio. The recommended decline rate
would depend on whether one used ‘‘GDP’’ or ‘‘GDP less GDP of
utility sector’’ in the denominator.
So, focusing on ‘‘Scope 1 emissions’’ is intellectually rigorous
and avoids double counting, but has another drawback. Using
GEVA based on Scope 1 would most likely reduce the corporate
incentive to cut Scope 2 emissions. A ‘‘political’’ compromise
might be to ask everyone to report on Scope 1þ2 emissions per
unit of value added and keep the desired decline rate of 5% per
year. This would be slightly illogical, but still provide a corporate
guide for voluntary climate action.
Fig. 6 shows a modiﬁed GEVA based on Scope 1þ2 for BT from
1997 to 2008. The modiﬁed GEVA declines faster than GEVA
based on Scope 1 in Fig. 4. The reason is BT’s huge shift towards
low-carbon energy during the measurement period. As a conse-
quence BT did succeed in cutting the modiﬁed GEVA by the
desired decline rate of 5% per year.
3.2. Value added is rarely used
This paper focuses on value added because the nation’s GDP is
the sum of the value added of all its corporations. Although value
added is the central concept in GDP, value added is surprisingly
unknown in the corporate world and among business economists.
Few seem to be aware that ‘‘gross proﬁt’’ in US accounts is the
same as value added. It will take time to make value added as
familiar as other denominators like ‘‘per sales,’’ ‘‘per ton of
production,’’ or ‘‘per USD of operating proﬁt.’’ A slightly illogical
compromise would be to use data for ‘‘emissions per unit of
revenue’’ or ‘‘emissions per unit of operating proﬁt.’’
3.3. Long time series are required
Value added is always less than revenue (by the amount paid
for goods and services purchased from external suppliers). Value
added can be seen as a fraction of revenue, and may ﬂuctuate
from year to year. Emissions, on the other hand, are rooted in
the corporate technology and proportional to slowly changing
production rates.
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Fig. 7. Economic value added (in 2010-£ per year), British Telecom, 1997–2008.
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year to year. Data from several years may be necessary to
establish a clear trend. Fig. 7 illustrates this phenomenon for BT.
There is a clear trend,3 but the annual values of GEVA deviate
from the trend. The ﬂuctuation is not excessive, but still the
annual variation might make GEVA unsuitable as a basis for
management compensation. Compensation might better be based
on the long-term trend.
3.4. Suggests a deﬁnition of fair share
Any corporation that cut its GEVA by 5% per year can argue it is
doing its ‘‘fair share’’ of the global effort to stabilise the climate
and help solve world poverty.
Still, the critic will make the point that absolute emissions
from a corporation will increase if it grows by more than 3.5% per
year. If the company succeeds in reducing its GEVA by 5% per
year, but grows at 7% per year in the process, its GHG emissions
will increase by 2% per year.
This does not invalidate the conclusion of this paper, because
corporations on average will only grow at 3.5% per year. It is true
that some corporations will grow faster then 3.5% per year and
increase their absolute emissions. But others will grow less fast,
or even decline, and reduce their absolute emissions. The total
value added of all corporations will, per my central assumption,
increase by 3.5% per year.
3.5. Gives room for corporate growth
It is simpler for a corporation to commit to reduction of an
intensity measure like GEVA, than to commit to absolute emission
cuts. This is because the intensity measure gives the corporation
room for future growth, be it endogenously or through mergers
and acquisitions. When a company grows, its emissions normally
grow. And since most corporations seek to expand, most corpora-
tions are worried about committing to constant emissions and –
even worse – to declining emissions. It is much simpler to commit
to declining intensities, like for example a decline in GEVA. The
corporation can commit to the suggested decline rate of 5% per
year in GEVA, argue it is doing its fair share, and proceed to grow
as fast as desirable.
This ﬂexibility increases the likelihood that corporations will
commit to measure GEVA, seek to reduce its value by minus 5%3 It is interesting that the value added of BT declined over this decade, but not
surprising given the huge divestitures during the period.per year, and report on performance. This conclusion is supported
by the fact that numerous ﬁrms already report on corporate
intensity performance – albeit with sales in the denominator – in
CDP’s Global 500 Carbon Disclosure Leadership Index (CDP, 2010).
3.6. No need to adjust the target
A consequence of the preceding point is that the corporation
does not need to adjust its target for GHG reduction even if it
happens to grow faster than anticipated. The target to achieve a
certain decline rate in GEVA – for example 5% per year – can be
maintained. This makes it simpler for corporations to commit to
reducing GEVA than to promise absolute cuts in GHG emissions.
GEVA is an intensity indicator that does not need to be revised
even if the company grows.
If the company prefers to decide on and communicate an
absolute emission cut, this absolute goal can easily be translated
into a commitment to reduce its GEVA. For example, if the
company wants to cut emissions by 20% from 2010 to 2020 (i.e.,
by minus 2% per year), and expects to double its value added in
the same period (i.e., by plus 7% per year), it implicitly commits to
a decline rate in GEVA of 9% per year.
3.7. Guides investors toward low-carbon corporations
GEVA tells how much economic value the corporation creates
for every ton of GHG emitted.
Thus GEVA is a useful indicator in a carbon-constrained world,
where it will be important to create as much value as possible for
each ton of GHG emitted.
A corporation which creates more value per ton of GHG can be
argued to be more sustainable, in the sense that it utilises a
limited resource in a more efﬁcient way. Thus a corporation with
a low GEVA – both absolute and relative to competitors – is likely
to be more sustainable (or at least less unsustainable). Thus GEVA
numbers may be a useful guide for long-term investors seeking
both more climate friendly and more sustainable operations.4
For the investor it is furthermore helpful to use value added as
the denominator in an indicator, rather than using the more
common denominator of sales. Using value added as the denomi-
nator helps allocate the responsibility for climate cuts (or other
impacts) to its proper place in the value chain. Using value added
as the foundation leads to an unambiguous distribution of ‘‘guilt’’
among the corporations and organisations, and avoids the pro-
blem of double counting. The principle is the same as when
computing the value added tax.
Corporations could further guide investors toward sustainabil-
ity by publishing other impacts (water use, oil consumption,
mercury emissions, etc) per unit of value added, as illustrated
by Tomra of Norway (Tomra, 2010).
3.8. Not cost efﬁcient
Notice that GEVA does not provide a guide toward cost
efﬁcient climate action. GEVA indicates where one is getting most
economic value created for each ton of GHG emitted. It does not
point towards the cheapest projects if the goal is to reduce
emissions in a cost efﬁcient manner. For this latter purpose, one
needs to know the cost of reducing emissions in various ways.
Many such lists exist — expressing the reduction cost in USD per
ton of CO2e. McKinsey and Co., 2010 is a good example.4 Others have suggested other indicators to guide investors toward higher
societal value, see for instance Simon Thomas et al., ‘‘Integrated environmental
and ﬁnancial performance indicators’’, Corporate Governance, Vol 3 No 15, page
421, 2009.
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Finally, there is the question of whether to use the same
suggested decline rate for all the world’s corporations. The
answer is deeply political and the logic as in the discussion of
national differentiation earlier in the paper.
It is of course possible to argue in favour of stricter require-
ments for particular corporations. For example for the big, or for
the multinationals, or for those owned by rich country investors,
or for those headquartered in rich countries, and so on. But any
such differentiation is difﬁcult, because it invites evasion.
Before deciding on differentiation it is important to consider
the automatic effect on distribution effect of applying the same
5% per year decline rate in GEVA to all corporations. The
(intended) effect is to allow fast growing ﬁrms to increase their
absolute emissions, while requiring slow growing ﬁrms to reduce
theirs. This amounts, in turn, to enabling a shift from dying to
growing industries — even when total emissions decline. It also
amounts to shifting GHG emissions to regions with many fast
growing ﬁrms — exempliﬁed by the emerging regions discussed
earlier in the paper.
In summary it appears difﬁcult to differentiate and GEVA may
well be best suited as a guide to voluntary action in progressive
ﬁrms who want to do more than required by legislation.4. Implementation
4.1. Voluntary action
The original intention of the work reported in this paper was
to develop a corporate indicator that could be used as a guide by
progressive ﬁrms that wanted to decide on the appropriate target
for their voluntary climate policy. The intention was to assist
corporations who wanted to move ahead of a potential binding
international climate framework and potential national legisla-
tion. Such progressive ﬁrms often asked: What is a reasonable
target? What would be our fair share of the global effort? How
much do we need to burden ourselves in order to be able to say
we have done our bit?
The suggested answer, namely to reduce the corporate GEVA
by 5% per year, was discussed in the preceding pages. The
corporate answer was supplemented by a guideline for voluntary
action at the national level, namely a suggested decline in the
GHG/GDP ratio of 5% per year.
The presumption was that the use of GEVA and the GHG/GDP
ratio would take the form of voluntary measurement and public
reporting. At the end of each year, progressive corporations would
measure their Scope 1 emissions and their value added during the
year. They would calculate their GEVA for the year and add it to
the history of earlier GEVA values in their non-ﬁnancial reports.
Once the time series was sufﬁciently long to deﬁne a trend in
GEVA, they would calculate its slope and compare the decline rate
with the corporate target, for example minus 5% per year, and
report on the result. Similarly the national statistical ofﬁce each
year would collect data for national GHG emissions and national
GDP during the last year, divide the two, add it to earlier values of
the GHG/GDP ratio, establish a trend and report on the decline
rate of this trend in the statistical yearbook.
There does not exist much incentive to do all this work,
beyond the rare corporate and national desire to be progressive
and forward looking for one reason or the other, as detailed
earlier in this paper. As a consequence, such reporting is not yet
common practice. At the national level, the underlying data
sometimes exist, but is not yet routinely combined into time
series of the GHG/GDP ratio.4.2. Current examples
At the corporate level, the numbers are harder to obtain, and
very few corporations have chosen to report on its impacts
(including GHG emissions) per unit of value added. This is in
spite of the intellectual rigour involved in such reporting, the
unambiguous distribution of blame along the value chain, and the
ﬂexibility it provides for the growth oriented manager.
There seem to be a few exceptions. UK’s BT plc, which
publishes its ‘‘climate stabilisation index,’’ deﬁned as Scope
1þ2þ3 emissions divided by its economic value added deﬁned
as EBITDA plus salary costs. BT furthermore has established goals
for this index (BT, 2010). Tomra of Norway has presented its
environmental impacts (including Scope 1þ2 emissions) per unit
of value added for a number of years (Tomra, 2010). Autodesk Inc
in California compares its annual Scope 1þ2þ3 emissions per
unit of value added with the decline rate necessary to reach its
corporate climate goal for 2050. This decline rate proves to be
minus 9% per year. This high target is partly explained by the fact
that Autodesk does not correct its sales for inﬂation (Stewart and
Deodhar, 2010).
4.3. Engaging civil society
If the necessary data were publicly available, civil society and
others could use the data to highlight whether a nation or
corporation is doing its fair share.
One way to increase the corporate and national incentive to
measure and report GEVA and GHG/GDP ratio would be to copy
the success of the Carbon Disclosure Project in coercing well-
known corporations to measure and report on their climate gas
emissions. CDP simply asks the largest corporations in the world
to provide their emission numbers, and then proceeds to publish
the response. If a corporation does not respond, this is conspicu-
ously highlighted in the CDP annual report. As a consequence of
this public blaming tactics, it did not take many years before most
respectable corporations did indeed measure and report their
climate gas emissions. This action, in turn, made it possible for
CDP to up the pressure by highlighting corporations with growing
emissions.
One expansion on this technique might be to have the CDP
publish GEVA numbers along with the emission numbers. And
after some years, calculate the trend, compare it to the suggested
decline rate of 5% per year, and publicise the result. This would
only require one more box in the CDP questionnaire, asking for
the corporation’s economic value added in the reporting year. CDP
has hesitated for fear that the extra burden would stop corpora-
tions from supplying the emissions data. But CDP or other civil
society activists could dramatically increase the motivation of
corporations to measure and report their GEVA. A third party
beneﬁciary would be the investor community who could use the
GEVA listings to pick companies that produce much economic
value per ton of GHG emissions.
A similar tactic would be to try to include GEVA in the Global
Reporting Initiative’s core set of indicators. This is, however, a
much longer uphill struggle, because of the consensus nature of
GRI decision making. Or one could try to make GEVA reporting
part of the charter of the UN Global Compact, but again this is
probably impossible because it breaks with the general nature of
the charter.
4.4. Passing legislation
The most direct route would be to establish new legislation
which made it mandatory to report on GEVA as part of mandatory
non-ﬁnancial reporting— and obligatory to publish the GHG/GDP
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term advantages for anyone in this amount of ‘‘increased bureau-
cracy,’’ I believe such initiatives would fail. This is even more so
for legislation that would require corporations to reduce their
GEVA by 5% per year, and with penalties if they do not.5. Conclusion
It is unlikely that legislation for mandatory measurement and
reporting of corporate GEVA and the national GHG/GDP ratio will
come forth over the next decade.
The practical utility of GEVA is therefore likely to remain as a
corporate guide to calibrate voluntary action in progressive ﬁrms
that want to move ahead of current legislation. In such cases
GEVA can act as a rational basis for the corporation’s climate
policy. The absolute value of the corporation’s GEVA and its
development over time will also help guide investors to identify
corporations that are likely to do well in a carbon-constrained
future.
The suggestion to cut the national GHG/GDP ratio by 5% per
year can similarly be used to calibrate national climate policy. But
since it is unlikely that international agreement will be reached to
this end anytime soon, the GHG/GDP ratio is likely to remain as a
guide to the voluntary climate policy of progressive nations that
want to move ahead of international agreements.
It certainly would accelerate implementation if civil society
chose GEVA and the GHG/GDP ratio as their standard metric to
evaluate the climate policy of corporations and nations, respec-
tively, gradually making them known in the public and gradually
making it less acceptable for emitters to escape routine reporting
of these performance indicators.Acknowledgements
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